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Abstract
Interest in the study of discretionary databases has grown
as numerous large-scale public file-sharing systems have
emerged as mainstream internet applications. In peer-to-peer
systems, Usenet, and other discretionary databases, the study
of incentivesis of particular importance, at it allows us to
model user behaviour and thus predict system performance.
We examine linear models of consumption utility and deter-
mine that they fail to capture important aspects of observed
behaviour. Instead, we propose a framework based ontopic
classesthat can be used to generate a wide variety of utility
models. Based on this framework, we quantify thecontri-
bution valueof an item. We primarily use the Usenet file-
sharing system to motivate the discussion, and show how file
value can be used to solve the capacity problem in Usenet.
Introduction
Shared databases are an increasingly important means of
facilitating dissemination and collection of information for
groups in organizations and in the general public. A
shared database isdiscretionaryif users contribute to the
database voluntarily. Social dilemmas arising from discre-
tionary databases have been studied long before the ad-
vent of modern peer-to-peer (P2P) systems (Sweeney 1973;
Kalman, Fulk, & Monge 2000). An infamous example of
a social dilemma is thefree-rider problem, which occurs
when the database suffers from under-supply due to users
not perceiving individual utility from contributing, choosing
instead to free-ride. The issue has gained recent prominence
as analysis of P2P systems has determined that they too suf-
fer from an incentive problem. For instance, a recent study
of the Gnutella network found that almost 70% of users are
free-riders (Adar & Huberman 2000).
There is a great deal of work that looks at the incentive
problem in P2P systems. Usually, this involves building a
model of the incentives and analyzing it using game theory,
simulation, or some other approach. Our primary objective
is to develop a flexible incentive framework for discretionary
databases that can be used in the modelling of specific sys-
tems. In particular, we argue that file size in file-sharing
systems is an inherently non-linear term in agent utility. An-
other important contribution is the inclusion of the concept
of collective identificationfrom the discretionary database
literature into our framework, which allows it to be included
in formal analysis. We apply our model to Usenet and find
it has significant explanatory power in that domain.
One of the goals in incentive analysis is to design new
systems that do not suffer from problems identified in cur-
rent systems. In doing so, the concept ofc ntribution value
is often an integral component. In P2P systems, for instance,
it has been proposed that contributors be rewarded in some
manner based on the value of their contribution to the sys-
tem. We present a quantified value of a contribution in dis-
cretionary databases which exhibits many desirable proper-
ties for use in system design. We demonstrate its application
to social dilemmas in P2P applications and in Usenet.
Related Work
There has been a significant amount of recent work in mod-
elling P2P systems. (Geet al. 2003) presents a broad perfor-
mance model which includes incentives. (Fuqua, Ngan, &
Wallach 2003) and (Mfeldmanet al. 2003) concentrate on
motivational issues. The latter gives additional insight into
the disincentives that contribute to the free-rider problem,
pointing out that sharing files can also hurt the capability of
the user to consume files due to asymmetric bandwidth. Sev-
eral papers have appeared that argue that game theory is the
correct tool for incentive modelling in P2P networks (Golle
et al. 2001; Buragohain, Agrawal, & Suri 2003). We agree
with that stance, and apply it to the setting of discretionary
databases in general.
Kalman et al. (Kalman, Fulk, & Monge 2000) present
a treatise on motivation models in discretionary databases.
They theorize that the social dilemmas inherent in such sys-
tems can be resolved by ensuring that a user identifies with
other users of the system, and with the collective as a whole.
This is a strong analogue to the way Usenet operates, and
provides insight into why people share files on current P2P
systems considering the inherent disincentives.
Problem Statement
As in previous work, we will build a game-theoretic model
of the discretionary database, and use the concept of Nash
equilibrium to analyze social dilemmas that occur in the
database. LetI = {a1, a2, . . . , an} be the set of agents
that may participate in the system. We model the actions
of these agents over a fixed time interval as a Baysian game
with actions, types, and rewards as defined below. Agents
contribute and consume amounts ofc ntentdivided into in-
dividual items.
We are primarily targeting databases where thesiz of the
content is an important factor in consumption and contribu-
tion utility, as in file-sharing systems such as peer-to-peer
networks and Usenet. In this setting, items are simply files.
Usenet
What started as a means of distributing textual discussion in
the 1970’s has become a significant means of sharing files,
with over 1 TB/day contributed to the system1. The file shar-
ing side of Usenet is an interesting case study because it is
a system that emerged without ever being designed for such
use. Indeed, all infrastructure that currently exists to support
file transfer arose in response to user activity rather than hav-
ing inspired it.
Usenet file transfer is similar to P2P networks in that it
is a distributed discretionary database for file transfer, but
differs from them in several important ways:
• One main problem in P2P networks (freeloading) is not as
important an issue on Usenet. Downloading does not put
a critical load on the system, and often the heaviest users
pay proportionately for their use.
• When shared, files are uploaded to the system even if they
are not wanted by any consumers. In a peer-to-peer sys-
tem, there is no intrinsic cost to sharing a file that is never
requested. This means that providing an incentive to share
desirable content is even more important on Usenet.
• Unlike in P2P networks, the performance of the system
degrades as a function of total uploading volume as ev-
ery contributed file is propagated to thousands of Usenet
nodes.
• Usenet exhibits a high level of community spirit, despite
being semi-commercial. This creates a greater incentive
to contribute to the system due to a greater identification
with the system and due to palpable positive or negative
feedback from other users.
Before examining the system in greater detail, we will
present the general motivational framework for discretionary
databases.
Actions
The participating agents haveconsumingactions andcon-
tributing actions. Since we are modelling a single time slice
of a repeated game, the amount agents choose to contribute
or consume can be thought of as contribute and consumption
rates, respectively.
Utility
An agent’s utility is composed of several factors divided into
two types: utility of consumption actions (νi) and utility of
contributory actions (µi). Total utility is the sum of these
two factorsui = µi+νi. We will assume risk-neutral agents
throughout (linear relationship between utility and money).
1As cited March 19, 2004 onalt.binaries.news-
server-comparison . Current statistics can be obtained at
http://newsfeed.visi.com/
Consumption utility Utility of consuming can be broken
down as follows:
• Content RetrievedThe amount of data successfully re-
trieved from the system. Agents may only be interested
in a set amount of content, after which they are made no
happier by downloading more.
• Variety The greater selection of content to choose from,
the happier the agent.
• BandwidthRepresents the cost of consuming data as a
combined function of bandwidth and the agent’s time.
• Explicit Cost There may be a explicit cost in terms of
“points” or dollars.
One of the principle motivations of this paper is to develop
a model for consumption utility in a discretionary databases
which better reflects reality. The general setting is as fol-
lows: LetQ be the set of content available for consumption.
Then the valuation functionνi(C) gives the utility of agent
ai ∈ I for consuming someC ⊆ Q.
The simplest model is linear in the quantity consumed
(νi(C) ∝ size(C)). This has the advantage of not having
to account for the cost of consuming (since it is assumed
to be rolled into the proportionality constant). One problem
is that we are assuming that the agent values all subsetsC
of the same size equally. In actuality an agent will value
different contributions to the system at different levels de-
pending on their interests. This approach, augmented with
abenefit matrixwhich allows differential valuation, is taken
in (Buragohain, Agrawal, & Suri 2003).
We define the matrixB = {bij} to be ann by n matrix
with entrybij ≥ 0 indicatingai’s interest in the contentaj
provides. The expression forai’s utility becomesνi(C) =∑
j 6=i bijcj , wherecj is aj ’s contribution inC. We can drop
the condition thatj 6= i by noting that∀i, bii = 0.
This model is much more useful, but still suffers from
problems. The main criticism is that the proportionality of
utility and size of content does not match our intuition for
the way discretionary databases are used. Firstly, it violates
variety; agents should be happier when they have a wider
choice of content. Secondly, linear models put too much
emphasis on size. If, for instance, a file-sharing system tried
to optimize social welfare (the sum of agent utilities across
the system), then a user downloading a cd-image (≈ 229
bytes) will be given the same weight as over a thousand users
downloading a jpeg picture (≈ 218 bytes). This emphasis
may not be desired.
We propose the following model that attempts to consider
both of these factors. The notion of variety can be thought of
analogously to the notion ofsubstitutabilityin auction the-
ory, which occurs when the total utility for obtaining two
goods is less than the sum of the utilities of obtaining the
goods individually. In a document database, the utility of
consuming an item will be less if the agent has access to
very similar documents already. The degree to which two
items are substitutable will vary enormously in the database.
In fact, it is unlikely that two items are completely indepen-
dent or perfectly correlated. We will assume that there are
classes of items whose substitutability is given by a function
and which are otherwise additive. Formally, letQ = ⋃ki Qi,
such that the{Qi} form a partition ofQ (ie., they are pair-
wise disjoint). ThenC ⊆ Q is defined asC = ⋃ki Ci with
Ci ⊆ Qi, and agentai’s utility for consumingC is:




whereφi is a function giving the cost of consumingC, and
wij areai’s value for the different classes. To model substi-
tutability, we require that the marginal utility gain in a class
goes to0 as the total consumption in the class increases. Al-
though not necessary in the general setting, we will make ad-
ditional continuity and differentiability assumptions in our
analysis.
Assumption 1. For any ai ∈ I, the class utility function
θi : [0,∞)× [0,∞) satisfies:
1. θi ∈ C2
2. θi(0) = 0
3. ∂θi(x)∂x > 0 (θi is non-decreasing)
4. ∂
2θi(x)
∂x2 < 0 (marginal utility gain goes to 0)
Two examples of functions that satisfy these properties
areθi(x) =
√
x andθi(x) = log (1 + x).
We are not the first to use diminishing returns in val-
uations. Downward-slopingvaluations are an important
and well-studied class of valuations in combinatorial auc-
tion theory. In addition, information-theoretic arguments
for diminishing-return valuations for general resources have
been presented in the network bandwidth allocation litera-
ture (Lazar & Semret 1998).
Contribution utility The classic social dilemma in discre-
tionary databases is the free-rider problem and has been ob-
served to occur on several P2P networks. Usenet is a theo-
retically similar but somewhat more dire situation. Unlike
some P2P systems, sharing is not default behaviour of the
application, and requires tangible cost to perform. Also,
whereas most P2P systems are non-commercial (which
might inspire some level of altruistic “donations”), access to
binary Usenet is dominated by commercial servers. Worst
still, on these commercial servers, users must pay to con-
sume and are given no credit for contributing!
This makes Usenet an intriguing case to analyze, as it does
not appear to suffer from a contribution problem despite the
disadvantages aforementioned. We believe the principal rea-
son lies in Fulk’s insight that users mayidentify with the
collective and consequently derive some personal satisfac-
tion in maximizing thecommon good. This effect manifests
on Usenet at a much greater level than on P2P systems for
several reasons. First, Usenet was originally a discussion
medium, and files are intermixed with discussion in a news-
group. This, combined with the very division of the system
into newsgroups, contributes to foster a sense of community
within a newsgroup which in turn contributes to the identifi-
cation of a user. Additionally, users can and do provide ex-
plicit positive and negative feedback to contributors within
the group.
Here is a summary of factors that influence the utility of
contributing to a discretionary database:
• Selfish/Altruistic MotiveThe personal satisfaction of
agent for contributing to the system, or the agent’s satis-
faction gained for contributing as much personal content
as possible to the system2.
• BandwidthCost to contribute, in time and bandwidth.
• Explicit RewardIn a micro-economic system, contribu-
tions may be explicitly rewarded.
• ReputationThe utility gained or lost by the positive or
negative feedback of others.
Selfishness and altruism are equivalent from the perspec-
tive of our model, and we will combine them with the in-
trinsic cost into a factorφi(ci). φi(ci) is usually positive,
meaning that the cost to contribute outweighs the selfish-
ness/altruism factor. We will assume thatφi(0) = 0.
Thusfeedbackis a crucial concept to capture when mod-
elling Usenet. We we model this by considering feedback
to be the total consumption utility derived by all other play-
ers from the content provided by this agent. We will assume
feedback is given with some fixed probability, which gives
(with the constant omitted):




whereν̃ji is ai’s contribution toaj ’s utility.
Application to Usenet
We will now apply this framework to develop an incentive
model for Usenet file sharing. Before analyzing the game,
we have to specify parameters left undefined in the previous
section.
The cost to contribute will be assumed to be linear and
governed by a factorγi unique to each agent. That is,
φi(x) = γix. We will also only considerφi(x) > 0. We
will also assume that all agents share a common class utility
functionθi = θj = θ. A crucial decision is to decide how
to partition content into classes to apply equation 1. We will
assume that each contributor contributes a set of partially-
substitutable content, and that there is no substitutability
among contributors. This simply involves assigning each
agent’s contribute to its own partition. This assumption also
allows us to return to usingB to represent an agent’s desire
for different content classes.
By rolling the cost function into the sum, we can re-write
equation 1 as follows to obtainai’s utility for consuming:





Note that we obtain the desirable property thatν̃ij can de-
crease (and even attain negative values). Once the marginal
2Selfishness can be manifest in several forms. One user we in-
terviewed confided that her principal motivation for sharing content
on KaZaA was to “show off” her personal music collection.
utility gain is less thanγi, the additional content present low-
ers the performance of the system and makes it less likely for
ai to find content that interests him.
Agentai’s utility for contributingci is given by





A Nash Equilibriumof a game is a set of agent strategies in
which any single agent cannot gain by unilateral deviation
(that is, considering every other agent’s strategy as fixed,
every agent is playing theirbest responsestrategy). While
computing Nash equilibria is normally a difficult problem,
we are aided by the structure of the setting. Due to the feed-
back factor, any time an agent contributes to another agent’s
utility (whether positively or negatively), the contribution is
manifested in their own utility in the agent’sµi term. Also,
the gain inνi from other agents’ actions is not affected by
ai’s action. Thus to find a Nash equilibrium we simply max-
imizeµi.
By combining equations 3 and 5, differentiating, and set-








Whether or not this has a closed-form analytic solution de-












Not all agents participating in usenet are reputation-
motivated. This can be a characteristic of the agent, or a
characteristic of the group, as the level of community spirit
varies considerably in usenet groups. Agents that are not
motivated by reputation do not have the feedback factor in
their contribution utilityµi, which means that their decision
to contribute depends only onφi(ci). They will behave to
maximize−φi(ci). If this occurs whenci = 0, the agent
will not contribute.
A mix of reputation-motivated and rogue agents seems
to be a good model for a Usenet group. The appro-
priate mix depends heavily on the group. For exam-
ple alt.binaries.sounds.mp3 is one of the most
community-oriented binary newsgroups on the network, to
the point of having an enforced charter and voluntary post-
ing limits. It is likely the group can be closely-modelled by
exclusively reputation-motivated agents.
Contribution Valuation
In the previous sections we have developed a general model
for utility in discretionary databases and applied it to Usenet.
In this section we will discuss how these ideas could be used
as components when designing new systems.
It is immediately apparent that our utility model as it
stands is not ideal for incorporation into a monetary pay-
ment scheme (for instance). This is because it involves sev-
eral quantities and concepts that are difficult to determine.
The interest weightswij are impossible to measure directly,
and the partition ofQ into non-substitutable classes{Qi}
seems difficult to get a handle on, considering the partition
could be in theory be completely different for each agent.
Value of an Item
The expected value to the system of an item contributed has
many potential uses. It can be used to reward the contributor
(whether monetarily, or through improved service), to deter-
mine contributor statistics, or to tune the performance of the
system by guiding resource allocation.
There are three key values relating to a itemf that will
be useful. They are the item’s sizefsize, the contribution
countfup, and the consumption countfdown. The precise
nature of these values will depend on the system in question.
In the case of a temporal database like Usenet,fdown and
fup are the raw counts in some rolling history, while in a
P2P system the might represent integrals of downloads and
sharing over time, respectively. We count all contributions
of the same item together since we are certain that they are
perfectly substitutable.
Intuitively, an item’s value should increase infdown and
decrease infup. Also, the item must be in a single topic
class for any given agent, so the utility from the size can be






Our intuition turns out to be a good approximation, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 2. Let f ∈ Q be an individual contribution to
the system. Then the expected valuev(f) whenf is con-
sidered part of a topic class is bounded byvfirst(f), and
is within a λ-factor of vfirst(f), whereλ is the expected
number of items in a topic class.





















sinceθ(λfsize) > θ(fsize) by assumption 1.
For many choices ofθ the situation is more rosy. In
the case whereθ(x) =
√




Use in P2P incentivizing
The use of the integral of content shared over time as a mea-
sure of contribution has been proposed by several authors in
the literature (Golleet al. 2001; Buragohain, Agrawal, &
Suri 2003). Golle notes that this provides an incentive for
agents to share unpopular files and to do so during times of
low demand, and suggest scaling factors to remedy these de-
fects. The use of our measure of contribution factor provides
a specific implementation of these factors. Let the reward for
sharing an file be:
∫





wherefup(t) is the number of users from whichf is avail-
able, andfdown(t) is the number of users downloadingf at
time t. fup(t) ≥ 1, so the reward is well-defined.
There are many advantages to this reward function. Users
gain more by sharing popular files, but only as long as the
supply isn’t too great. Rare files will be downloaded less
frequently, but the supply will also be smaller, thus provid-
ing no disincentive to share rare files. Finally, the number of
accesses will be low during off-peak times, thus there is no
incentive to only connect during those periods.
Competition for system resources
Earlier, we showed how positive and negative feedback from
other users can influence the contribution rate for reputation-
motivated agents. This is a form of collective regulation of
individual action. Unfortunately, the way Usenet is struc-
tured, this cannot solve the resource allocation problem
which we define below. We will show how this problem
might be alleviated using the concept contribution valuation
as defined in the previous section.
Let us return to the user-benefit matrixB. Some insight
can be gained by examining its structure. First, in a general
file-sharing system, most of the entries will be0 because of
the wide variety of content available. Second,B is likely
to appear symmetric, in the sense that ifbij = 0, there is
a high probability thatbji = 0, and likewise for non-zero
entries. This is due to the idea that if there is interest be-
tween two agents in one direction, it is likely that their con-
tent is topically similar, so there will be a mutual interest
expressed. For the same reason,B will appear to be transi-
tive (bij > 0 ∧ bjk > 0 → bik > 0 with high probability).
These structural properties mean that we can permute the
indices of agents to obtain a block-diagonal form (with the
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where boldface0’s denote block of zeros. This corresponds
to a partitioning of the agents into groups of mutual topical
interest. This effect is most apparent on Usenet, where the
partitions correspond to newsgroups (or sets thereof).
This is a problem in Usenet because agents are only mo-
tivated by feedback from other agents in the same group.
However, the system resources are shared by all groups.
Since there is little to no feedback or collective identifica-
tion between an agent and a group to which he doesn’t be-
long, there is no incentive for groups to act non-selfishly in
acquiring system resources.
Modelling the competition
We will model the bandwidth competition as a Baysian
game, and assume that groups of agents can through feed-
back achieve a desired collective action. Thus we consider
entire groupsas individual players in this game.
Let κ be the amount of the a system performance re-
source, such as the total bandwidth per time slice that can be
propagated without loss. A player’s utility is proportional to
the expected amount downloaded3. Let ci ∈ [0, ki] be the
amount uploaded per time slice for playeri, and denote by
s−i the strategy of all other players . If
∑
i ci ≤ κ, then an
agents utility isui ∝ ci. Otherwise, the contribution exceeds
the system’s capacity. Letfi(c1, c2, . . . , cn, κ) be a function
that calculates the expected fraction of playeri’s content that





j cj ≤ κ
ci · fi(c1, c2, . . . , cn, κ) otherwise (10)
In Usenet, the most common way to choosefi is to drop
articles with uniform probability, which means that
∀i, fi = f(c1, c2, . . . , cn, κ) = κ∑
j cj
Figure 1 shows what single player’s utility for different val-











Figure 1: Player 1’s utility surface in the 2-player bandwidth
competition game forκ = 70
Proposition 3. In the n-player bandwidth competition
game,S = {k1, k2, . . . , kn} is the unique Bayes-Nash equi-
librium.
Proof. Consider playeri keepingc−i fixed. Forci ≤ ki, we
have








3This holds in our model as long as the number of classes is
proportional toci










soE(ui) increases monotonically inci and has a global max-
imum atci = ki (sinceci ∈ [0, ki]). Since this is a dominant
strategy equilibrium, it is unique.
This is a problem for servers as users in a group have in-
centive to post amounts of content beyond what they value to
gain a larger slice of the global resource pie. This increases
load unnecessarily and causes other performance problems.
Incentivizing reasonable behaviour
In this section we will outline a scheme to allocate Usenet
resources in such a way that doesn’t create an unbounded
incentive to upload content. Consider an auction whereci is
the amount of good divisibleκ that playeri desires. We will
use a Progressive Second Price (PSP) auction as mechanism
which are proven to be efficient and incentive compatible
(Kounavis 1997; Lazar & Semret 1998). Instead of eliciting
a numeric bid value, we will take the marginal collective
valuation of the content uploaded as the bid value in some
unit that we will call “points”. If groupi postsci of content
in filesFi, then its bid is:











Groups with the highest collective valuation will be allo-














Each group will have to pay a cost in points that is equal to







k 6=i ak(s−i)− ak(s)
)
These points will be used to determine how much retention
the group’s content receives, which is the length of time the
files are kept on the server before being expired. Groups
with a higher marginal valuation will be willing to pay a
higher cost in retention.
Note that this scheme is vulnerable to manipulation, as a
user could post a large quantity of useless data in a compet-
ing group, thus lowering their marginal valuation and mak-
ing their own group’s content more likely to have higher val-
uation. This can be overcome by requiring a certain number
of accesses before a file is counted in a group’s bid.
Conclusion
We have proposed a motivational framework for discre-
tionary databases that has greater expressive power than lin-
ear models and better corresponds to observed practice. We
have used it to quantify the utility of collective identification
and feedback and applied the model to Usenet and determine
that it has good explanatory power in that setting. Addition-
ally, we determined a quantification for the value of a contri-
bution in a discretionary database, and showed how it can be
used to solve social dilemmas in peer-to-peer networks and
Usenet file transfer.
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